Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined by Alabrese, Eleanora et al.
European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2018) 1–19
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
European Journal of Political Economy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejpe
Who voted for Brexit? Individual and regional data combined
Eleonora Alabrese a, Sascha O. Becker b,∗, Thiemo Fetzer c, Dennis Novy d
a University of Warwick, United Kingdom
b University of Warwick, Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE), CEPR, CESifo, ifo, IZA and ROA, United Kingdom
c University of Warwick, Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE), SERC, United Kingdom
d University of Warwick, Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE), CEPR, CESifo and CEP/LSE, United Kingdom
A R T I C L E I N F O
JEL Classiﬁcation:
D72
I10
N44
R20
Z13
Keywords:
Aggregation
Ecological fallacy
European Union
Populism
Referendum
UK
A B S T R A C T
Previous analyses of the 2016 Brexit referendum used region-level data or small samples based
on polling data. The former might be subject to ecological fallacy and the latter might suﬀer
from small-sample bias. We use individual-level data on thousands of respondents in Understand-
ing Society, the UK’s largest household survey, which includes the EU referendum question. We
ﬁnd that voting Leave is associated with older age, white ethnicity, low educational attainment,
infrequent use of smartphones and the internet, receiving beneﬁts, adverse health and low life
satisfaction. These results coincide with corresponding patterns at the aggregate level of voting
areas. We therefore do not ﬁnd evidence of ecological fallacy. In addition, we show that predic-
tion accuracy is geographically heterogeneous across UK regions, with strongly pro-Leave and
strongly pro-Remain areas easier to predict. We also show that among individuals with simi-
lar socio-economic characteristics, Labour supporters are more likely to support Remain while
Conservative supporters are more likely to support Leave.
1. Introduction
Populism has been on the rise across Europe and the United States in recent years, culminating in the election of Donald Trump
as US President and the Brexit vote in the 2016 EU referendum. The Brexit vote came as a shock to many observers and triggered
early attempts to understand the voting patterns.1 These studies relied almost exclusively on aggregate data at the level of voting
areas. Regressing vote shares across voting areas on average population characteristics risks falling into the ecological fallacy trap of
inferring individual associations from aggregate data (see Robinson, 1950).
We use detailed individual-level data from the Understanding Society survey containing the EU referendum question to address
three interrelated questions. First, we investigate the relationship between voters’ personal characteristics and their expressed voting
intentions. Particularly, we address whether ecological fallacy may be driving the associations documented in the aggregated data.
Second, building a predictive model of Leave support we assess which voting determinants have the most power to predict voting
behavior out of sample. Third, we investigate the classiﬁcation errors that this predictive model makes by region and voters’ closeness
to political parties.
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1 See Burn-Murdoch (2016) in the Financial Times as an example of various correlation plots; more in-depth work followed, for example Clarke and Whittaker
(2016), Darvas (2016), Langella and Manning (2016).
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We ﬁnd that individual and aggregate coeﬃcients point in a similar direction, suggesting that ecological fallacy is of limited
concern. Second, we document that the predictive models exhibit a signiﬁcant gain in accuracy when exploiting both individual
and regional variables. Lastly, we document that a predictive model performs best in parts of the UK with the most extreme ref-
erendum outcomes: Lincolnshire (highest Leave share) and London (lowest Leave share across mainland Britain). Furthermore, a
decomposition of classiﬁcation errors reveals that closeness to a political party is likely an important omitted variable, suggesting
that unobservable traits and identity are further key correlates.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the literature background, describes the data and explains our empirical
approach. We present graphical summaries of our results in Section 3, and we conclude in Section 4. Underlying regression results
and further details are relegated to an appendix.
2. Background, data and empirical approach
2.1. Background
This paper builds on Becker et al. (2017) who analyze the Brexit vote shares across UK voting areas, using a wide range of
explanatory variables. They show that the Leave vote shares are systematically correlated with older age, lower educational attain-
ment, unemployment, or employment in certain industries such as manufacturing, as well as with a lack of quality of public service
provision.
These results ﬁt in with other evidence on the Brexit vote. An early attempt to explain the referendum outcome was made by
Ashcroft (2016) whose polling data indicated that the typical Leave voter is white, middle class and lives in the South of England.
Sampson (2017) reviews the literature on the likely economic consequences of Brexit on the British economy and other countries.
Our paper also relates to the wider literature on political polarization as well on voting for far-right parties. Ferree et al. (2014)
provide an extensive review of academic works which link voting patterns to demographic, economic and political features. Voters’
behavior has also been shown to be strongly associated with individual scepticism towards institutions (e.g. Euroscepticism) or
intolerance against foreigners (see Whitaker and Lynch, 2011; Clarke and Whittaker, 2016; Arzheimer, 2009). Additional studies
claim that ethnic minorities may engage in ‘ethnic’ or ‘policy’ voting depending on the issue they are called to vote upon (see Bratton
and Kimenyi, 2008; Tolbert and Hero, 1996).
Polarization has also been related to immigration (see Barone et al., 2016) as well as trade integration (Dippel et al., 2015;
Burgoon, 2012; Autor et al., 2016). In the UK context, Becker and Fetzer (2016) examine immigration from Eastern Europe as a
potential driver of support for the UK Independence Party, while Fetzer (2018) explores the role of austerity policies since 2010.
Overall, the voting patterns in the Brexit referendum are complex. One possible – albeit not the only – interpretation of the
empirical literature on Brexit so far is that some people who favor Leave may feel ‘left behind’, be it economically or culturally (see
Hobolt, 2016; Clarke et al., 2017). This is consistent with sociological studies which demonstrate similar patterns for the Tea Party
Movement and the 2016 US presidential election, e.g. Hochschild (2016).
2.2. Data
Are these aggregate patterns found by Becker et al. (2017) and others a fair reﬂection of individual-level relationships? The
individual-level data from wave 8 of the Understanding Society survey makes it possible to investigate this question. Our focus is on
individual socio-economic variables for which region-level equivalents are used in Becker et al. (2017). Our approach of combining
individual-level and aggregate data allows us (a) to check whether ecological fallacy is an important factor in aggregate analyses of
the Brexit vote, and (b) to exploit the combined predictive power of individual-level and aggregate variables. This opens up insights
into (c) geographic heterogeneity in predictive power across UK regions.
The Understanding Society data cover a wide range of topics, in particular basic demographic data for all household members
such as sex, age and ethnicity, place of birth, family background including marital status, educational attainment, current job
characteristics, housing characteristics (owning vs. renting), health status and life satisfaction. We describe the sampling design in
more detail in the appendix, and how we construct our sample (also see Knies, 2016; Buck and McFall, 2012).
2.3. Descriptive statistics
According to the summary statistics in Table 1, 42.2% of the 13,136 individuals in our sample indicate that the UK should leave
the EU in response to the survey question “Should the UK remain a member of the EU or leave the EU?” This compares to 51.9% of
the electorate voting Leave in the referendum. We refer to Becker et al. (2017, section 3.1) for a discussion of the aggregate voting
and turnout patterns in the 2016 referendum.
As for demographics, the proportion of males is 45.4% of all individuals in the sample, while just about three out of ten respon-
dents are aged 60 or above. People with no qualiﬁcation account for about 8% of the sample. Roughly 90% of respondents are
born in the UK. Asians are the largest ethnic minority amounting to 5.8% of the sample, followed by blacks (2.5%).2 Over half of
2 Note that we sourced nationality and ethnicity variables also from earlier waves.
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variables N mean sd min max
Dependent variable:
Should the UK leave the EU 13,136 0.422 0.494 0 1
Individual variables:
Sex = Male 13,136 0.454 0.498 0 1
Age = 60 or older 13,136 0.305 0.460 0 1
Highest qualiﬁcation = Other lower qualiﬁcation 13,136 0.0847 0.278 0 1
Highest qualiﬁcation = No qualiﬁcation 13,136 0.0796 0.271 0 1
Frequency using internet = Every day 13,136 0.792 0.406 0 1
Frequency using internet = No access 13,136 0.0153 0.123 0 1
Born in UK 13,136 0.905 0.294 0 1
Ethnic group = White 13,136 0.896 0.306 0 1
Ethnic group = Asian 13,136 0.0579 0.234 0 1
Ethnic group = Black 13,136 0.0245 0.155 0 1
Current legal marital status = Single 13,136 0.287 0.452 0 1
Current legal marital status = Married or civil partner 13,136 0.546 0.498 0 1
Visits GP in 12 m = None 13,136 0.214 0.410 0 1
Visits GP in 12 m = Over 10 13,136 0.0613 0.240 0 1
Housing tenure = Owned (outright + mortgage) 9,344 0.664 0.472 0 1
No work last week & doesn’t have paid job 13,136 0.379 0.485 0 1
Current job sector = Manufacturing 7,950 0.0826 0.275 0 1
Income support 13,136 0.0158 0.125 0 1
Dissatisﬁed with health 13,136 0.244 0.430 0 1
Dissatisﬁed with income 13,136 0.214 0.410 0 1
Aggregated variables:
Unemployment rate (2015) 13,136 5.618 2.159 1.600 12.10
Share of suspected cancer patient treated within 62 Days (2015) 13,136 84.02 7.554 33.30 100
CV life satisfaction APS well-being data (2015) 13,136 0.989 0.394 0.570 3.050
Manufacturing employment share (2001) 13,136 0.153 0.0518 0.0538 0.337
Owned (outright + mortgage) share (2001) 13,136 0.684 0.0975 0.274 0.882
Notes: The table reports the number of observations (N), their mean, standard deviation (sd) as well as the minimum and maximum values.
The summary statistics for the aggregate variables are reported based on the raw data, whereas in the regression tables these variables are used
in standardized form.
respondents are married or in a civil partnership. In terms of current employment, roughly four out of ten people declare to be
without a paid job or to not have worked in the seven days prior to being questioned.3
2.4. Understanding Society: Research in progress
We gained access to Understanding Society data in the summer of 2017, at the same time as other groups of researchers in a pilot
‘early access’ project. We brieﬂy summarize related preliminary ﬁndings reported by other researchers in short presentations in the
summer of 2017. For instance, Creighton and Amaney (2017) ﬁnd that opposition to immigration played a key role. Martin and
Sobolewska (2017) explore racial determinants and ﬁnd that ethnic minorities are strongly in favor of remaining in the EU. De Vries
and Solaz (2017) attempt to explain voters’ behavior by analyzing socio-economic determinants such as asset holdings, sources of
income and skills, whereas Doebler et al. (2017) explore additional potential drivers such as personal economic struggle and regional
economic decline.
As far as we are aware, only one other paper using Understanding Society data has come out as a working paper so far. Liberini
et al. (2017) show that individuals dissatisﬁed with their own ﬁnancial situation were more likely to vote Leave and that the very
young were most likely to vote Remain. In related work, Pollock (2017) uses the Innovation Panel to argue that the rise in populism
and the vote in favor of Brexit can be attributed to generational shifts away from mainstream political parties over the past three
decades.
2.5. Empirical approach
We start with a simple model where the dependent variable yic is a dummy for individual i in local authority c which takes on the
value 1 if the interviewed person answers “Leave” in response to the question “Should the UK remain a member of the EU or leave
the EU?” and 0 if the answer is “Remain”:
yic = x′ic𝛽 + z′c𝛿 + 𝜀ic. (1)
The independent variables in the model are the Understanding Society cross-sectional individual covariates xic on the one hand, and
area-speciﬁc aggregate variables zc from Becker et al. (2017) on the other. Our overall sample contains 13,136 respondents for our
3 The aggregate variables in Table 1 are not standardized for descriptive purposes, but they are in all regressions.
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baseline regressions. We also analyze smaller samples and subgroups of variables since not all Understanding Society respondents
were asked each survey module. As the summary statistics in Table 1 show, roughly 42% of respondents are in favor of Leave.
We relegate the details of the underlying regression results to the appendix. For ease of interpretation, throughout the regression
tables in the appendix we provide coeﬃcients obtained from a simple linear probability model estimation of Eq. (1). However, each
model is also estimated using the corresponding logistic regression model to provide an estimate of the success rate at the bottom of
each table.
Since our interest centers on prediction, we need a metric to assess predictive accuracy of our regression models. We perform
a simple validation exercise known from the machine learning literature. Our sample is divided into a random training set (2∕3 of
the sample) and a validation set. Logistic regressions are conducted on the training set, and we use the validation set to perform
classiﬁcation. We follow Bayes’ optimal decision rule and classify an observation as “Leave” if the predicted posterior probability
exceeds 50%. In essence, this simple rule allocates the label (“Leave” or “Remain”) to an observation that, conditional on our
predictors/features, is most likely. This decision rule minimizes the error rate or maximizes overall accuracy. Yet, it does so putting
an equal penalty or cost on false positives versus false negatives. The comparison of the predicted to the actual assignments allows
us to estimate the out-of-sample predictive power and to shed light on the two types of prediction errors (false positives versus false
negatives). For instance, individual A in the validation set may, based on her characteristics, look like a typical Remain voter but is
in reality a Leave voter, so we have a case of a false negative. Individual B in the validation set may, based on her characteristics,
look like a typical Leave voter but is in reality a Remain voter, so we have a case of a false positive.
We stress that causality is beyond the scope of our paper. Instead, our results reﬂect a broad range of correlation patterns relating
voting intentions to fundamental socio-economic features.4 In our earlier work (Becker et al., 2017), we grouped variables by four
topics: (1) EU exposure: immigration, trade and EU transfers; (2) Public service provision and ﬁscal consolidation; (3) Demography,
education and life satisfaction; (4) Economic structure, wages and unemployment. Those groupings follow from prominent hypothe-
ses that have been proposed to explain the EU referendum result. That is, the ﬁrst grouping looks at the relationship between EU
exposure and Leave voting. Here, we follow the same logic and look at groups of variables that correspond to one speciﬁc set of
explanations for the referendum result. For each variable grouping, we assess its predictive power by itself, and compare this to the
joint predictive power of all groups of variables combined. We discuss the diﬀerent groupings in more detail in the appendix (the
regression tables using the groups of variables under discussion are described in sections A.4-A.10 in the appendix).5
As Becker et al. (2017) explain, the fundamental diﬀerence between prediction, as pursued in this paper, and causal inference
is as follows. Causal inference focuses on the internal validity of causally estimated reduced-form (or structural) parameters 𝛽 . In
contrast, prediction is concerned with the external validity of the estimated ﬁtted values ŷ.6 Causal inference seeks to obtain a set of
estimated parameters 𝛽 that are usually studied in isolation. Thus, they often do not render themselves useful for prediction because
the out-of-sample model ﬁt is generally poor. Instead, good model ﬁt typically requires a multitude of regressors, and machine
learning can often substantially improve out-of-sample predictive performance (Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017). The underlying
estimated parameters that yield good model ﬁt are typically of limited interest per se. For this reason, we only show coeﬃcient
estimates in appendix tables, while in the main text we focus on graphical representation.
3. Predicting the vote
In order to focus on prediction quality, we relegate the discussion of individual regression tables to the appendix. First, we
focus on the relative predictive power of individual-level and aggregate variables. Second, we examine the predictive power of our
best-performing model across regions and lastly, we investigate the classiﬁcation error structure.
3.1. Individual vs. aggregate variables
Fig. 1 reports the proportion of correct predictions (success rates) for each variable grouping estimated in the hold-out sample.
In particular, Fig. 1(a) illustrates success rates for (groupings of) aggregate variables and Fig. 1(b) for individual-level variables.
Fig. 1(c) combines aggregate and individual-level variables. Fig. 1(d) reports success rates for non-comparable individual variables.
The overall classiﬁcation success rate when we rely on aggregate data in Fig. 1(a) is 58.8%. In the narrow individual-level sample
for which employment and related individual data is collected in the Understanding Society sample, the overall accuracy reaches
62.9% when we use the aggregate level area employment characteristics. The improvement in terms of accuracy relative to a naive
classiﬁcation rule that classiﬁes everyone as Remain (generating a success rate of 57.8%, i.e. one minus the sample ‘Leave’ share)
thus is only modest. When focusing on all comparable individual-level covariates in Fig. 1(b), we see that individual-level variables
have stronger predictive power than aggregate ones. The improvement in accuracy up to 63.4% with all variables included suggests
an improvement in prediction accuracy relative to the naive benchmark by 9.7%.
4 In a fascinating paper, Colantone and Stanig (2018) focus on one speciﬁc causal factor behind the Leave vote: rising import competition from China. While papers
studying causality are extremely important, they give prominence to one factor at a time, an aim diﬀerent from ours which is to look at the relative predictive power
of diﬀerent variables.
5 One might wonder whether including region ﬁxed eﬀects above and beyond the individual-level and region-level predictors is beneﬁcial in terms of prediction
accuracy, but the beneﬁts are very marginal in our case. Since region ﬁxed eﬀects are a ‘black box’, we refrain from including them given the very limited gains.
6 While we do not use machine-learning methods in this paper such as best subset selection (BSS) or LASSO, we did so in Becker et al. (2017), i.e. our selection of
variables is guided by the (aggregate) variables employed in that earlier paper.
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Fig. 1. Success rates by variable groupings. Notes: The graph plots success rates for diﬀerent variable groupings. Light blue refers to models for our main sample
with covariates comparable at the individual and aggregate levels. Orange relates to variables which are only available for smaller subsamples (individuals answering
questions on housing or employment). Dark blue applies to models combining all available covariates in the main sample. Finally, green relates to individual-level
variables which do not have a comparable grouping in the aggregate data.
Furthermore, an inspection of the tables in the appendix conﬁrms that the individual-level predictors yield broadly similar sign
patterns to their aggregate-level equivalents. This suggests that ecological fallacy is not a major concern for the results in Becker et
al. (2017).
The combination of individual and aggregate characteristics yields a further slight improvement in prediction accuracy. Relative
to the naive classiﬁcation rule, accuracy can improve up to 64.6% with all covariates included, representing an improvement of
11.7% in relative terms. Adding further individual-level characteristics that are included in the Understanding Society sample (but for
which no aggregate proxy measures exist) suggests that overall accuracy is not further improved.
In fact, our best model including all characteristics sees a small drop in the success rate. In terms of the bias-variance trade-
oﬀ inherent in such predictive models, the improvements in terms of bias are therefore likely oﬀset by an inﬂation in terms of
variance, resulting in worse out-of-sample performance. We refer to James et al. (2013) for a discussion of the bias-variance trade-
oﬀ.
As explained in the appendix, we explore a number of novel individual determinants. We ﬁnd that marital status, technology
use and dependence on income support and state beneﬁts are all systematically linked to individual voting behavior. In particular,
individuals who do not possess smartphones and who use the internet infrequently appear more inclined to support Leave. Those
repeatedly seeking health care or receiving income support also tend to be more in favor of Brexit. Similarly, it is also fair to say that
Brexit is a predominantly white phenomenon compared to ethnic minorities.
3.2. Geographical heterogeneity
An instructive step lies in attempting to decompose in which regions our model does a good job of correctly classifying the voting
intentions in the Understanding Society sample. Among all NUTS2 regions in Fig. 2, Inner London displays the lowest error rate (21%)
followed by Lincolnshire and North Eastern Scotland (with 23% and 26%, respectively). Lincolnshire and Inner London had among
the highest and lowest Leave vote shares in the referendum. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the empirical model performs well in
separating voters in these regions.
The model has the lowest performance in Tees Valley and Durham, East Anglia, and Merseyside (with error rates around 43–44%).
Generally, the picture that emerges suggests that purely based on the socio-economic characteristics, areas that are more disadvan-
taged are the ones where it is most diﬃcult to separate Leave from Remain voters. Non-economic factors may therefore be particularly
helpful in capturing variation between voters in these areas.
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Fig. 2. Error rates and decomposition into false positives versus false negatives.
3.3. Types of errors
We turn to decomposing errors into false positives and false negatives. The results presented in Fig. 2 suggest that the regions of
Inner and Outer London, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxford as well as North Eastern Scotland stand out as having the highest
rate of false negatives (blue bars). False negatives are cases in which our model identiﬁes an individual as a Remain voter, while in
fact they state an intention to vote Leave. The false negatives in Fig. 2 suggest that there are non-negligible proportions of voters
6
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Fig. 3. Overall accuracy and error decomposition by stated party preference (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, SNP and Others).
who, based on their socio-economic characteristics, look like Remain voters but actually express an intention to vote Leave. In Outer
London, 80% of all classiﬁcation errors are false negatives. The same holds true for many of the other regions in London’s wealthy
commuter belt.
We next investigate whether classiﬁcation errors can be related to individual political party preferences. From previous Under-
standing Society survey rounds which asked participants what party they felt closest to, we obtain that measure for 65% of our
estimation sample. Fig. 3 highlights that, while overall accuracy across the stated historical party preferences is similar, the type of
classiﬁcation error is quite heterogeneously distributed. In particular, Labour voters are more likely to contribute to the false positive
errors – cases where our model classiﬁes an individual as a Leave voter when in fact they favor Remain – making up 51.27% of the
share of all false positives. By contrast, Conservative party supporters make up 44.8% of the share of false negatives – individuals
who look like Remain voters but actually intend to vote Leave.
Overall, our ﬁndings indicate that Labour voters with observables that put them in the Leave camp – male, older, less educated,
less likely to be in employment, etc. – are signiﬁcantly more likely to express a preference for the status quo of remaining in the EU.
Voters with similar socio-economic proﬁles who identify with the Conservative Party are more likely to vote Leave. This suggests the
potential importance of other characteristics not in the data set, for instance psychological traits such as openness as well as attitudes
towards national identity.
4. Conclusion
Individual-level regressors from the British Understanding Society survey containing the 2016 EU referendum question give similar
results to corresponding aggregate variables at the level of local authority areas analyzed by Becker et al. (2017). We therefore ﬁnd
no evidence of ecological fallacy eﬀects – individuals appear to behave in similar ways as suggested by the aggregate data.
We also shed light on the predictive power of diﬀerent determinants of the Leave vote. Demographics and employment character-
istics are the most relevant covariates for prediction, while the cumulative power of individual-level and aggregate variables shows
a non-negligible gain over aggregate data alone. Geographical heterogeneity is also important as our model performs best in more
prosperous areas (London in particular).
Finally, we also ﬁnd that individuals who support the Labour Party but have otherwise observables that would put them in the
Leave camp are signiﬁcantly more likely to vote Remain. Vice versa, supporters of the Conservative Party with Remain-favouring
characteristics are more likely to vote Leave.
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Appendix
A. Data and regression results
In this appendix we present our data and empirical regression results in more detail.
A.1. Sampling design
Concerning the design and data collection of Understanding Society, the general population sample is a stratiﬁed, clustered, equal
probability sample of residential addresses drawn to a uniform design throughout the whole of the UK. For each wave, the data
collection is spread over a two-year period, and the overall sample is divided into 24 monthly subsamples, each independently
representative of the UK population. Computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) was mainly used to collect the data.7
A.2. Constructing the sample
The construction of our sample takes place in various steps. Initially, the raw individual survey (wave 8) consists of 21,076
observations. Then, matching the household survey leaves 20,821 individuals. Further matching with local authority codes results
in a sample of 17,697 respondents (i.e. over 3000 surveyed individuals get lost because there is no location code associated with
their households). Finally, we merge this last sample with the aggregate information used in Becker et al. (2017). In this last step,
the number of surveyed individuals is 15,844 across 377 local authorities.
When we consider the initial sample with 21,076 observations, 91% of the individuals provide an answer to the question con-
cerning British EU membership. Among them, the share of those supporting Leave is 35.8%. Of the selected subsample with 15,844
units, 91.4% (14,476 individuals) disclose an answer for the outcome variable, and 42.6% turn out to be Leave supporters.8
As a ﬁnal remark, we want to stress that our estimates come from the analysis of three speciﬁc subsamples of the 14,476 selected
respondents. The main one contains 13,136 individuals. The sample with housing tenure status contains 6,425 individuals. The
subsample on employment characteristics counts 8,434 individuals.
A.3. Regression results
We divide our variables into groupings as follows. The ﬁrst group of explanatory variables includes basic demographic features
such as sex, age, marital status, education and employment. The second group explores data on individuals’ use of health services.
The third group captures information on housing (ownership vs. renting) drawn from the household questionnaire. The fourth group
refers to employment. This is followed by a focus on unearned income and state beneﬁts. The sixth group consists of life satisfaction
indicators. The seventh and ﬁnal group covers nationality and ethnicity.
The results are reported in Tables A.1a to A.10. We present linear probability models as the default, with the exception of logit
models in Table A.1b, probit models in Table A.1c and weighted OLS models in Table A.1d and A.1e.9
When variables are perfectly comparable at individual and aggregate levels, the ﬁrst three columns of the tables directly compare
those to address the potential ecological fallacy concern.
A.4. Demographics, technology, education and employment
In Tables A.1a to A.3 we present results from regressions based on diﬀerent types of demographic characteristics. Tables A.1a to
A.1e explore the relationship of voting Leave with sex, age and technology use. Table A.1a presents our baseline results estimated
with a linear probability model (OLS). Tables A.1b and A.1c use the same explanatory variables but estimated with logistic and probit
regressions, respectively, where we report marginal eﬀects. Table A.1d reports weighted OLS regressions, with weights provided by
Understanding Society. Table A.1e also displays weighted OLS regressions, but here we use artiﬁcial weights such that the proportion
of Leave supporters in the sample matches the actual Brexit vote share. Overall, the coeﬃcient signs and magnitudes are very similar
across Tables A.1a to A.1c. They are also similar in comparison to Table A.1d and A.1e despite the weights and the reduced number
of observations. We therefore focus our below discussion on Table A.1a.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table A.1a exhibit positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the old-age variables at both individual and aggregate
levels, showing no evidence of ecological fallacy. Although the coeﬃcient for the aggregate share of the elderly population is lower
in magnitude, it presents a predictive power very similar to the individual counterpart. Column 4 indicates that males are 4.7%
7 These details are taken from Understanding Society: Design Overview by Buck and McFall (2012). For further details refer to the Understanding Society User
Guide (wave 1–6) by Knies (2016).
8 In unreported tables (available upon request), we compare the 14,476 individuals who answer the Brexit question to the 1,368 non-respondents for each group
of covariates (i.e. all regressors in Tables A.1a to A.10 in the appendix) and establish along which dimension the two groups are statistically diﬀerent. If anything,
non-respondents seem to display most of the characteristics of a typical Leave voter. More speciﬁcally, non-respondents are signiﬁcantly older, less used to technology,
with lower educational attainments and more frequently unemployed. In addition, they seek more medical attention, their housing status is more often local authority
renting, and more of them receive income support. Finally, non-respondents are less often UK natives and more often members of an ethnic minority.
9 We would like to note that sampling weights in Understanding Society, which we use in Table A.1d are quite homogenous. In our main estimation sample, the
median sampling weight is 0.956, the 25th percentile is 0.770 and the 75th percentile is 1.237. This explains why weighted and unweighted regression results are so
similar. [USOC wave 8 data has a substantive number of observations with missing weights. This is due to the fact that it is a pre-release version. The ﬁnal version of
wave 8 is expected to be released towards the end of 2018 or in early 2019.] In Table A.1e, we mechanically re-weight the sample to align the share of Leave voters
with the actual referendum result.
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more likely to vote Leave. Compared to middle-aged respondents, the tendency to support Leave is substantially lower by 12.3% for
younger cohorts up to the age of 30 and notably higher by 9.1% for individuals aged 60 or above. Columns 5 and 7 conﬁrm these
results in terms of signiﬁcance even when we control for the share of the population aged 60 or above at the local authority level. In
column 6 we focus on technology use. Individuals who do not use a smartphone are substantially more likely to vote Leave. Using
the internet every day is associated with a substantially lower probability to vote Leave. These patterns persist even once we control
for sex and age in column 7.
In Table A.2 we explore the predictive power of educational attainment. Again, variables on educational attainment relate
to the referendum outcome in the same way and with similar matching power at both individual and aggregate levels although
aggregate coeﬃcients have lower magnitude and signiﬁcance. Hence, highly qualiﬁed individuals with university and college degrees
are considerably less likely to vote Leave by over 20% compared to people with average qualiﬁcations. In contrast, having no
qualiﬁcation is a very strong predictor of voting Leave. These results hold up once we control for aggregate characteristics on
educational attainment in columns 3 and 5 as well as sex and age in column 6.
Next, in Table A.3 we analyze individuals’ current employment and marital status. At the individual level, comparison groups
are predominantly retired and divorced respondents, respectively.10 Here, aggregate rates on employment are indistinguishable
from zero (although they have the same predictive power as the individual variables, and self-employment and unemployment
coeﬃcients have the ‘correct’ sign). Column 1 of Table A.3 shows that self-employed and paid employees are more likely to support
Remain (relative to mostly retired people). Column 4 shows that single and married people are signiﬁcantly less likely to vote Leave
(compared to divorcees, separated and widowed people). Again, most of these results hold up once we control for aggregate rates in
column 3 as well as for age in column 5. Unemployment now also shows up as highly signiﬁcant.11
To sum up our results on demographic variables, we ﬁnd that individuals are more likely to support Leave if they are male, older,
use less technology, are less qualiﬁed, retired or unemployed, and divorced, separated or widowed. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the results by Becker et al. (2017) based on aggregate data who also ﬁnd that age, low educational attainment and unemployment
are key explanatory variables to predict the Leave vote shares across UK voting areas.
A.5. Health
Table A.4 analyzes the relationship between Brexit support and individuals’ use of health services. Interestingly, columns 1 and
2 show that individuals who visit their general practitioner (GP) very frequently (over ten times in the previous 12 months) are
more likely to support Leave. Those are arguably individuals of poor health or older generations. Conversely, those who did not
visit the GP even once have a slightly higher probability to support Remain. Controlling for age in column 2 turns the latter result
insigniﬁcant (possibly because it is young people who do not go to the doctor) but preserves the former result on frequent GP visits.
A similar picture emerges from columns 3 and 4, focusing on individuals who are never or extremely often classiﬁed as out-
patients. The same holds for people admitted as in-patients at least once during the preceding 12 months. That is, people of poor
health as proxied by frequent visits to the GP or hospital are substantially more likely to support Leave. Perhaps it is therefore no
coincidence that a key pledge of the pro-Brexit referendum campaign was to invest more in the National Health Service (NHS).
A.6. Housing
Table A.5 explores the role of property values for home owners and housing tenure (owned vs. rented). We note that due to many
missing values, we only have 6,425 observations in this table.
When directly comparing individual tenure status to corresponding aggregate shares we see similar paths (columns 1 to 3), in
particular with respect to direct ownership which is positively related to Leave support.
In terms of individual housing tenure, owning their own property tends to make individuals more likely to support Leave, although
this particular association is barely statistically signiﬁcant. The omitted category here is renting through a housing association.
More importantly, higher property values are signiﬁcantly related to an increased likelihood of supporting Remain. A one-standard
deviation increase in property values increases the Remain likelihood by roughly 4%. Property values are arguably positively linked
to individuals’ ﬁnancial status, which would be consistent with earlier evidence on income based on aggregate data (see Becker et
al., 2017).
A.7. Employment
This section shifts the focus towards employment-related determinants. For starters, Table A.6 indicates a higher probability of
almost 10% to support Leave for individuals who did not work in the week prior to the questionnaire and who did not have a paid
job compared to those respondents who were either working or had a paid job (stable across all speciﬁcations).
In Table A.7 we narrow our analysis to only those participants who worked or had a paid job. This reduces the number of
observations to 8,434. First, columns 1 to 3 compare the individual sector of employment to the respective aggregate controls
10 Excluded categories among current activity feature Retired (64.7%), Looking after family or home (10%), Full-time student (14.3%), Long-term sick or disabled
(7.5%), Doing something else (2.2%). Excluded categories among marital status feature Divorced (57.4%), Separated (10.3%), Widowed (31.6%), Other (0.7%).
11 To get a sense of whether changes in (un)employment status matter, in unreported regressions, we used additional information based on a short employment
history (looking at respondents participating in both wave 7 and the pre-release version of wave 8 with the EU question). The results suggest that the preferences
for Remain and Leave are quite static or do not respond in a remarkable fashion to individuals switching employment status (by becoming unemployed or employed
between wave 7 and wave 8). Rather, the ﬁrst-order diﬀerences in tendencies to support Leave or Remain for our prediction exercise are driven by individuals who
are employed or unemployed in both survey waves, implying that looking at only the cross-section is suﬃcient to capture the role of employment variables.
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(manufacturing, construction, retail and ﬁnance as used in Becker et al., 2017). Estimates as well as their predictive power are aligned
(although aggregate coeﬃcients are lower in magnitude). Indeed, both speciﬁcations suggest that workers in the manufacturing,
construction and retail industries are signiﬁcantly more likely to support Leave. Note that individual estimates are fairly stable
across all speciﬁcations.
In addition, it emerges from column 4 that those with a permanent job compared to those in non-permanent employment have
a higher probability of supporting Leave. This result continues to hold qualitatively in column 5 after we control for individuals’
age, sex and education as well as the sectoral distribution and growth of employment at the aggregate level in column 6. This result
appears surprising, but we note that the subsample in Table A.7 is highly unbalanced in the sense that 90% of the respondents have
a permanent job. Still, 60% of individuals with permanent jobs support Remain versus 70% of those with temporary jobs. It also
appears likely that the very young respondents, who are overwhelmingly in favor of Remain, are less likely to hold permanent jobs.
Our age dummies in column 5 might not pick up these age patterns appropriately. Finally, self-employed respondents are also more
likely to support Leave, even though this association is insigniﬁcant for most speciﬁcations in the table.
Overall, consistent with the aggregate results in Becker et al. (2017) our ﬁndings support the view that individuals are more
willing to vote for Brexit if they work in sectors such as manufacturing that have arguably been hit relatively hard by trade openness
and international competition (also see Colantone and Stanig, 2018). In addition, workers in manufacturing, construction and retail
sectors have lower educational attainment on average while the opposite is true for workers in the ﬁnancial sector.
A.8. Unearned income and state beneﬁts
In Table A.8 we highlight the role of unearned income and state beneﬁts. In column 1 we ﬁnd that respondents who receive core
beneﬁts have a signiﬁcantly raised probability of supporting Leave compared to those receiving none. These core beneﬁts are broken
down into their various components in column 2. In particular, recipients of income support are substantially more likely to be in
favor of Leave (by 20%), whereas job seeker’s allowance, child beneﬁt and universal credit do not matter.
Similar results hold for people receiving pensions. This particular ﬁnding is likely driven by the overwhelming share of older
people amongst pension receivers (see section A.4). The same pattern holds for people on disability beneﬁts, in line with our
estimates on health service usage (see section A.5).
Finally, the opposite is true for respondents who receive other sources of income. Those are broken down in column 3. The key
income streams are education grants and student loans as well as payments from family members living elsewhere. This suggests a
tight link with age and education (see section A.4).
In summary, the forms of income and beneﬁts in Table A.8 are likely correlated with more fundamental characteristics such as
age and health, as discussed in previous tables.
A.9. Life satisfaction
In Table A.9 we explore the potential link between Brexit support and indices of health, income and life satisfaction. When
looking at overall life satisfaction only (columns 1 to 3), the individual coeﬃcients suggest that dissatisﬁed people are signiﬁcantly
more likely to favor Leave while the aggregate estimate implies that a higher relative dispersion of well-being across voting areas,
which can be interpreted as a measure of life satisfaction inequality, has positive predictive power for the Leave support. Success
rates of prediction are very similar whichever level of variation is considered.
In addition, people dissatisﬁed with health and income have a higher probability of supporting Leave by 5.5% and 6.4%, respec-
tively. Once again, we can relate these ﬁndings to those in Table A.4 on health and Table A.8 on income and beneﬁts. Interestingly,
people dissatisﬁed with their amount of leisure time are signiﬁcantly more likely to support Remain by 6.3%. This may be linked to
the fact that these respondents have on average higher levels of educational attainment and they are generally younger. Note that
when these individual variables are considered (columns 4 and 5) the individual estimate of overall life satisfaction is absorbed and
becomes insigniﬁcant.
A.10. Nationality and ethnicity
Table A.10 provides insights on the importance of individuals’ nationality and ethnicity in shaping their attitudes towards Brexit.
Survey participants born in the UK as opposed to elsewhere have a signiﬁcantly larger probability of supporting Leave by 12.4% (see
column 1). It is useful to point out that in the sample, 90% of respondents are born in the UK, and 95% of them are white.
In terms of ethnic minorities compared to whites (see column 2), people of mixed ethnicity, Asians and black respondents all have
a signiﬁcantly larger probability of supporting Remain (in the range of 12%–23%). These results are in line with the preliminary
work by Martin and Sobolewska (2017).
Finally, aggregate controls for migration are insigniﬁcant with the exception of the EU share of migrants in 2001, which is positive
linked with support for Remain.
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Table A.1a
Demographics: sex, age and technology use (OLS).
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex=Male 0.0471∗∗∗
(0.0073)
0.0473∗∗∗
(0.0073)
0.0502∗∗∗
(0.0072)
Age=30 or younger −0.1226∗∗∗
(0.0130)
−0.1192∗∗∗
(0.0126)
−0.1092∗∗∗
(0.0128)
Age=60 or older 0.1240∗∗∗
(0.0113)
0.1174∗∗∗
(0.0112)
0.0911∗∗∗
(0.0116)
0.2808∗∗∗
(0.0729)
0.2367∗∗∗
(0.0726)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0339∗∗∗
(0.0069)
0.0280∗∗∗
(0.0069)
0.0365∗∗∗
(0.0076)
0.0364∗∗∗
(0.0075)
Age = 60 or older ∗ Share population 60 or older (2001) −0.0925∗∗∗
(0.0336)
−0.0917∗∗∗
(0.0332)
Use smartphone=No 0.0776∗∗∗
(0.0126)
0.0382∗∗∗
(0.0129)
Has mobile computing device=No 0.0134
(0.0099)
0.0214∗∗
(0.0098)
Frequency using internet=Every day −0.1018∗∗∗
(0.0148)
−0.0760∗∗∗
(0.0148)
Frequency using internet=No access 0.0358
(0.0398)
0.0320
(0.0400)
Constant 0.3845∗∗∗
(0.0093)
0.4221∗∗∗
(0.0083)
0.3864∗∗∗
(0.0088)
0.3954∗∗∗
(0.0097)
0.3363∗∗∗
(0.0237)
0.4817∗∗∗
(0.0154)
0.3907∗∗∗
(0.0261)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5820 0.5827 0.5834 0.5891 0.5910 0.5887 0.5917
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are
presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
Table A.1b
Demographics: sex, age and technology use (Logit).
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex=Male 0.0480∗∗∗
(0.0074)
0.0484∗∗∗
(0.0074)
0.0518∗∗∗
(0.0074)
Age=30 or younger −0.1265∗∗∗
(0.0134)
−0.1238∗∗∗
(0.0131)
−0.1147∗∗∗
(0.0135)
Age=60 or older 0.1240∗∗∗
(0.0113)
0.1176∗∗∗
(0.0112)
0.0904∗∗∗
(0.0115)
0.2899∗∗∗
(0.0696)
0.2489∗∗∗
(0.0716)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0340∗∗∗
(0.0070)
0.0284∗∗∗
(0.0071)
0.0382∗∗∗
(0.0081)
0.0382∗∗∗
(0.0081)
Age = 60 or older ∗ Share population 60 or older (2001) −0.0980∗∗∗
(0.0338)
−0.0975∗∗∗
(0.0338)
Use smartphone=No 0.0779∗∗∗
(0.0127)
0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0129)
Has mobile computing device=No 0.0136
(0.0100)
0.0221∗∗
(0.0101)
Frequency using internet=Every day −0.1019∗∗∗
(0.0148)
−0.0761∗∗∗
(0.0149)
Frequency using internet=No access 0.0358
(0.0409)
0.0319
(0.0412)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Notes: The table reports results from Logit regressions in terms of marginal eﬀects. Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard
errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
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Table A.1c
Demographics: sex, age and technology use (Probit).
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex=Male 0.0478∗∗∗
(0.0074)
0.0481∗∗∗
(0.0074)
0.0513∗∗∗
(0.0074)
Age=30 or younger −0.1257∗∗∗
(0.0133)
−0.1233∗∗∗
(0.0131)
−0.1139∗∗∗
(0.0134)
Age=60 or older 0.1240∗∗∗
(0.0113)
0.1176∗∗∗
(0.0112)
0.0906∗∗∗
(0.0116)
0.2903∗∗∗
(0.0704)
0.2489∗∗∗
(0.0721)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0341∗∗∗
(0.0070)
0.0285∗∗∗
(0.0071)
0.0382∗∗∗
(0.0081)
0.0383∗∗∗
(0.0080)
Age = 60 or older ∗ Share population 60 or older (2001) −0.0980∗∗∗
(0.0339)
−0.0975∗∗∗
(0.0338)
Use smartphone=No 0.0778∗∗∗
(0.0126)
0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0129)
Has mobile computing device=No 0.0135
(0.0100)
0.0219∗∗
(0.0101)
Frequency using internet=Every day −0.1018∗∗∗
(0.0148)
−0.0761∗∗∗
(0.0148)
Frequency using internet=No access 0.0358
(0.0406)
0.0321
(0.0409)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Notes: The table reports results from Probit regressions in terms of marginal eﬀects. Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard
errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
Table A.1d
Demographics: sex, age and technology use (Weighted OLS using USOC sampling weights).
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex=Male 0.0359∗∗∗
(0.0120)
0.0359∗∗∗
(0.0120)
0.0390∗∗∗
(0.0120)
Age=30 or younger −0.1265∗∗∗
(0.0203)
−0.1255∗∗∗
(0.0204)
−0.1149∗∗∗
(0.0201)
Age=60 or older 0.1393∗∗∗
(0.0133)
0.1351∗∗∗
(0.0131)
0.1030∗∗∗
(0.0143)
0.2986∗∗∗
(0.0893)
0.2608∗∗∗
(0.0903)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0243∗∗∗
(0.0085)
0.0175∗∗
(0.0084)
0.0272∗∗∗
(0.0100)
0.0266∗∗∗
(0.0100)
Age = 60 or older ∗ Share population 60 or older (2001) −0.0943∗∗
(0.0413)
−0.0951∗∗
(0.0414)
Use smartphone=No 0.0818∗∗∗
(0.0167)
0.0355∗∗
(0.0178)
Has mobile computing device=No 0.0004
(0.0147)
0.0095
(0.0146)
Frequency using internet=Every day −0.1089∗∗∗
(0.0190)
−0.0737∗∗∗
(0.0189)
Frequency using internet=No access −0.0021
(0.0464)
−0.0074
(0.0468)
Constant 0.3901∗∗∗
(0.0108)
0.4332∗∗∗
(0.0092)
0.3910∗∗∗
(0.0106)
0.4093∗∗∗
(0.0123)
0.3488∗∗∗
(0.0310)
0.5019∗∗∗
(0.0201)
0.4040∗∗∗
(0.0360)
Observations 8188 8188 8188 8188 8188 8188 8188
Notes: The table reports results from weighted linear probability regressions, using Understanding Society sampling weights (weighted OLS). Non-dummy
variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
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Table A.1e
Demographics: sex, age and technology use (Weighted OLS using weights that mechanically align share of ‘Leave’ voters with referendum result).
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Individual Aggregate Both
Sex=Male 0.0480∗∗∗
(0.0074)
0.0481∗∗∗
(0.0074)
0.0510∗∗∗
(0.0073)
Age=30 or younger −0.1288∗∗∗
(0.0138)
−0.1255∗∗∗
(0.0134)
−0.1152∗∗∗
(0.0137)
Age=60 or older 0.1254∗∗∗
(0.0113)
0.1188∗∗∗
(0.0112)
0.0916∗∗∗
(0.0116)
0.2916∗∗∗
(0.0733)
0.2478∗∗∗
(0.0731)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0071)
0.0288∗∗∗
(0.0071)
0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0079)
0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0078)
Age = 60 or older ∗ Share population 60 or older (2001) −0.0974∗∗∗
(0.0337)
−0.0966∗∗∗
(0.0334)
Use smartphone=No 0.0782∗∗∗
(0.0126)
0.0380∗∗∗
(0.0128)
Has mobile computing device=No 0.0136
(0.0101)
0.0218∗∗
(0.0100)
Frequency using internet=Every day −0.1023∗∗∗
(0.0147)
−0.0760∗∗∗
(0.0146)
Frequency using internet=No access 0.0332
(0.0380)
0.0295
(0.0382)
Constant 0.4343∗∗∗
(0.0096)
0.4730∗∗∗
(0.0085)
0.4362∗∗∗
(0.0092)
0.4456∗∗∗
(0.0100)
0.3839∗∗∗
(0.0239)
0.5320∗∗∗
(0.0153)
0.4378∗∗∗
(0.0261)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Notes: The table reports results from weighted linear probability regressions (weighted OLS). Weights mechanically reproduce the Brexit referendum result.
Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05,
∗p <0.1.
Table A.2
Demographics: education.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Aggregate Both
Highest qualiﬁcation=Degree −0.2590∗∗∗
(0.0115)
−0.2407∗∗∗
(0.0119)
−0.2348∗∗∗
(0.0119)
−0.2162∗∗∗
(0.0123)
−0.2394∗∗∗
(0.0123)
Highest qualiﬁcation=Other higher degree −0.0842∗∗∗
(0.0155)
−0.0793∗∗∗
(0.0156)
−0.0601∗∗∗
(0.0157)
−0.0556∗∗∗
(0.0157)
−0.0796∗∗∗
(0.0161)
Highest qualiﬁcation=Other lower qualiﬁcation 0.1478∗∗∗
(0.0177)
0.1473∗∗∗
(0.0176)
0.1019∗∗∗
(0.0171)
Highest qualiﬁcation=No qualiﬁcation 0.0988∗∗∗
(0.0181)
0.0948∗∗∗
(0.0178)
0.1229∗∗∗
(0.0186)
0.1190∗∗∗
(0.0183)
0.0822∗∗∗
(0.0184)
Share of res. pop. qualiﬁcation 4+ (2001) −0.0442∗∗∗
(0.0134)
−0.0292∗∗
(0.0128)
−0.0220∗
(0.0131)
−0.0171
(0.0127)
Share of res. pop. no qualiﬁcations (2001) 0.0244∗
(0.0132)
0.0180
(0.0127)
0.0210∗
(0.0123)
0.0285∗∗
(0.0119)
Share population 60 or older (2001) 0.0145∗∗
(0.0065)
0.0086
(0.0064)
Sex=Male 0.0520∗∗∗
(0.0072)
Age=30 or younger −0.1637∗∗∗
(0.0123)
Age=60 or older 0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0119)
Constant 0.4968∗∗∗
(0.0098)
0.4223∗∗∗
(0.0079)
0.4915∗∗∗
(0.0092)
0.4727∗∗∗
(0.0104)
0.4673∗∗∗
(0.0096)
0.4798∗∗∗
(0.0105)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5940 0.5887 0.6052 0.6092 0.6135 0.6404
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors
are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
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Table A.3
Demographics: employment and marital status.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual Aggregate Both
Current activity= Self-employed −0.0489∗∗∗
(0.0184)
−0.0473∗∗
(0.0183)
−0.0263
(0.0195)
Current activity= In paid employment −0.0773∗∗∗
(0.0112)
−0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0112)
−0.0336∗∗∗
(0.0125)
Current activity=Unemployed 0.0199
(0.0266)
0.0161
(0.0269)
0.0896∗∗∗
(0.0269)
Self-employment rate (2015) −0.0026
(0.0082)
−0.0043
(0.0081)
−0.0052
(0.0079)
Employment rate (2015) 0.0027
(0.0113)
0.0049
(0.0113)
0.0027
(0.0111)
Unemployment rate (2015) 0.0156
(0.0114)
0.0157
(0.0114)
0.0188∗
(0.0112)
Current legal marital status= Single −0.1714∗∗∗
(0.0149)
−0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0166)
Current legal marital status=Married or civil partner −0.0890∗∗∗
(0.0136)
−0.0679∗∗∗
(0.0139)
Age=30 or younger −0.1213∗∗∗
(0.0160)
Age=60 or older 0.0639∗∗∗
(0.0136)
Constant 0.4653∗∗∗
(0.0107)
0.4223∗∗∗
(0.0087)
0.4654∗∗∗
(0.0108)
0.5201∗∗∗
(0.0137)
0.5006∗∗∗
(0.0175)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5839 0.5843 0.5937 0.5921
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors
are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
Table A.4
Health.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Visits GP in 12m=None −0.0271∗∗
(0.0107)
−0.0113
(0.0106)
Visits GP in 12m=Over 10 0.0892∗∗∗
(0.0203)
0.0847∗∗∗
(0.0199)
Age=60 or older 0.1213∗∗∗
(0.0113)
0.1200∗∗∗
(0.0114)
0.1226∗∗∗
(0.0114)
Share of suspected cancer patient treated within 62Days (2015) −0.0213∗∗
(0.0088)
−0.0211∗∗
(0.0087)
−0.0214∗∗
(0.0088)
Out-patient in 12m=None −0.0331∗∗∗
(0.0085)
−0.0166∗
(0.0086)
Out-patient in 12m=Over 10 0.0791∗∗∗
(0.0277)
0.0717∗∗∗
(0.0271)
In-patient in 12m=Yes 0.0475∗∗∗
(0.0150)
0.0353∗∗
(0.0150)
Constant 0.4226∗∗∗
(0.0091)
0.3826∗∗∗
(0.0096)
0.4379∗∗∗
(0.0097)
0.3926∗∗∗
(0.0103)
0.4182∗∗∗
(0.0088)
0.3820∗∗∗
(0.0091)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5818 0.5974 0.5880 0.5910 0.5839 0.5944
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors
are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
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Table A.5
Housing.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Aggregate Both
Value of property: home owners −0.0428∗∗∗
(0.0111)
−0.0422∗∗∗
(0.0114)
−0.0408∗∗∗
(0.0112)
Housing tenure = Owned (outright + mortgage) 0.1595∗∗
(0.0760)
0.1269∗
(0.0694)
0.1141∗
(0.0626)
0.1143∗
(0.0682)
0.1303∗
(0.0712)
Housing tenure=Rented from employer or private −0.0109
(0.1831)
0.0100
(0.1681)
−0.0020
(0.1675)
0.0206
(0.1688)
Housing tenure= Local authority rent 0.2391
(0.1923)
0.1811
(0.1880)
0.2285
(0.1836)
Age=60 or older 0.1311∗∗∗
(0.0151)
0.1317∗∗∗
(0.0151)
0.1318∗∗∗
(0.0151)
Owned (outright + mortgage) share (2001) 0.0799∗∗∗
(0.0183)
0.0783∗∗∗
(0.0184)
0.0372∗∗∗
(0.0069)
0.0201
(0.0180)
0.0469∗∗
(0.0214)
Owned (outright + mortgage) share growth (2001–2011) −0.0184∗∗
(0.0075)
−0.0391∗
(0.0214)
−0.0613∗∗∗
(0.0232)
Private rented share (2001) 0.0132
(0.0116)
0.0132
(0.0116)
−0.0139
(0.0119)
0.0013
(0.0134)
Privated rented share growth (2001–2011) −0.0170
(0.0209)
−0.0396∗
(0.0228)
Council rented share (2001) 0.0360∗∗
(0.0174)
0.0350∗∗
(0.0174)
0.0380∗∗
(0.0189)
Council rented share growth (2001–2011) −0.0115
(0.0093)
Constant 0.2609∗∗∗
(0.0757)
0.4187∗∗∗
(0.0076)
0.2928∗∗∗
(0.0691)
0.2611∗∗∗
(0.0622)
0.2607∗∗∗
(0.0678)
0.2444∗∗∗
(0.0708)
Observations 6425 6425 6425 6425 6425 6425
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5772 0.5729 0.5729 0.6026 0.6002 0.6050
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Two-way clustered standard errors at the
local authority and household levels are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
Table A.6
Current employment: all individuals.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Aggregate Both
No work last week & doesn’t have paid job 0.0979∗∗∗
(0.0101)
0.0970∗∗∗
(0.0101)
0.0939∗∗∗
(0.0098)
Unemployment rate (2015) 0.0144∗
(0.0083)
0.0127
(0.0082)
0.0171∗∗
(0.0074)
Manufacturing employment share (2001) 0.0347∗∗∗
(0.0079)
Manufacturing employment share change (2001–2011) 0.0042
(0.0081)
Construction employment share (2001) 0.0086
(0.0105)
Construction employment share change (2001–2011) 0.0088
(0.0098)
Retail employment share (2001) 0.0361∗∗∗
(0.0078)
Retail employment share change (2001–2011) −0.0237∗∗∗
(0.0068)
Finance employment share (2001) 0.0023
(0.0078)
Finance employment share change (2001–2011) −0.0131
(0.0085)
Constant 0.3852∗∗∗
(0.0097)
0.4223∗∗∗
(0.0087)
0.3856∗∗∗
(0.0098)
0.3866∗∗∗
(0.0084)
(continued on next page)
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Table A.6 (continued)
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Aggregate Both
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5839 0.5797 0.5942
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered
standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
Table A.7
Current employment: individuals with paid jobs.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Aggregate Both
Current job=Permanent 0.0924∗∗∗
(0.0177)
0.0580∗∗∗
(0.0176)
0.0504∗∗∗
(0.0174)
Current job sector=Manufacturing 0.1395∗∗∗
(0.0191)
0.1159∗∗∗
(0.0187)
0.1352∗∗∗
(0.0191)
0.0731∗∗∗
(0.0191)
0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0186)
Current job sector=Construction 0.1704∗∗∗
(0.0268)
0.1604∗∗∗
(0.0266)
0.1659∗∗∗
(0.0269)
0.0858∗∗∗
(0.0260)
0.0811∗∗∗
(0.0257)
Current job sector=Wholesale & retail 0.0877∗∗∗
(0.0177)
0.0747∗∗∗
(0.0176)
0.0854∗∗∗
(0.0177)
0.0350∗∗
(0.0172)
0.0284∗
(0.0172)
Current job sector= Finance −0.0449
(0.0277)
−0.0415
(0.0274)
−0.0484∗
(0.0278)
−0.0437
(0.0275)
−0.0426
(0.0272)
Current job= Self-employed 0.0267
(0.0177)
0.0301∗
(0.0173)
0.0380∗∗
(0.0175)
0.0136
(0.0168)
0.0153
(0.0166)
Sex=Male 0.0328∗∗∗
(0.0099)
0.0329∗∗∗
(0.0100)
Age=30 or younger −0.1338∗∗∗
(0.0142)
−0.1306∗∗∗
(0.0138)
Age=60 or older 0.0184
(0.0189)
0.0200
(0.0185)
Highest qualiﬁcation=Degree −0.2714∗∗∗
(0.0124)
−0.2563∗∗∗
(0.0127)
Highest qualiﬁcation=Other higher degree −0.1020∗∗∗
(0.0185)
−0.0979∗∗∗
(0.0188)
Manufacturing employment share (2001) 0.0470∗∗∗
(0.0092)
0.0437∗∗∗
(0.0091)
0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0091)
Manufacturing employment share change (2001–2011) 0.0005
(0.0082)
Construction employment share (2001) 0.0250∗∗
(0.0109)
0.0236∗∗
(0.0107)
0.0038
(0.0098)
Construction employment share change (2001–2011) −0.0001
(0.0093)
Retail employment share (2001) 0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0088)
0.0377∗∗∗
(0.0087)
0.0260∗∗∗
(0.0083)
Retail employment share change (2001–2011) −0.0143∗
(0.0077)
Finance employment share (2001) 0.0086
(0.0092)
0.0106
(0.0093)
0.0134
(0.0090)
Finance employment share change (2001–2011) −0.0178∗∗
(0.0090)
Self-employment rate (2015) 0.0149∗
(0.0089)
0.0144
(0.0088)
0.0127
(0.0089)
Unemployment rate (2015) 0.0161∗∗
(0.0078)
Constant 0.3550∗∗∗
(0.0103)
0.3874∗∗∗
(0.0084)
0.3583∗∗∗
(0.0095)
0.2709∗∗∗
(0.0195)
0.4354∗∗∗
(0.0210)
0.4375∗∗∗
(0.0200)
Observations 8434 8434 8434 8434 8434 8434
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.6111 0.6204 0.6132 0.6118 0.6370 0.6560
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard errors
are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
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Table A.8
Unearned income and state beneﬁts.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
(1) (2) (3)
Receives core beneﬁts 0.0357∗∗∗
(0.0124)
Receives pensions 0.1177∗∗∗
(0.0115)
Receives disability beneﬁts 0.1119∗∗∗
(0.0167)
Receives other beneﬁts or credits 0.0867∗∗∗
(0.0131)
Receives other sources of income −0.0496∗∗∗
(0.0152)
Core beneﬁts:
Income Support 0.2002∗∗∗
(0.0354)
Job Seeker’s Allowance 0.0467
(0.0404)
Child Beneﬁt 0.0006
(0.0131)
Universal Credit 0.0357
(0.0472)
Other sources of income:
Education Grant other than a Student Loan or Tuition Fee Loan −0.2329∗∗∗
(0.0286)
Trade Union or Friendly Society Payment 0.1427
(0.1883)
Maintenance or Alimony 0.0636∗
(0.0361)
Payments from a family member not living with you −0.1063∗∗∗
(0.0402)
Rent from Boarders or Lodgers (not family members) living here with you −0.0823
(0.0646)
Rent from any other property even if that only covers that property’s mortg −0.0317
(0.0201)
Or any other regular payment −0.0812∗∗
(0.0381)
Constant 0.3615∗∗∗
(0.0102)
0.4182∗∗∗
(0.0090)
0.4287∗∗∗
(0.0089)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5977 0.5875 0.5841
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level
clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
Table A.9
Life satisfaction.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual Aggregate Both
Dissatisﬁed with health 0.0549∗∗∗
(0.0116)
0.0533∗∗∗
(0.0116)
Dissatisﬁed with income 0.0643∗∗∗
(0.0121)
0.0652∗∗∗
(0.0121)
Dissatisﬁed with amount of leisure time −0.0625∗∗∗
(0.0111)
−0.0629∗∗∗
(0.0111)
Dissatisﬁed with life overall 0.0252∗∗
(0.0125)
0.0262∗∗
(0.0125)
−0.0101
(0.0156)
−0.0085
(0.0156)
CV life satisfaction APS well-being data (2015) 0.0263∗∗∗
(0.0073)
0.0265∗∗∗
(0.0073)
0.0263∗∗∗
(0.0073)
(continued on next page)
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Table A.9 (continued)
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
Ecological fallacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual Aggregate Both
Constant 0.4187∗∗∗
(0.0089)
0.4223∗∗∗
(0.0085)
0.4186∗∗∗
(0.0087)
0.4107∗∗∗
(0.0095)
0.4108∗∗∗
(0.0093)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5848 0.5866 0.5804 0.5850
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level clustered standard
errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
Table A.10
Nationality and ethnicity.
Variables Should the UK leave the EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Born in UK 0.1239∗∗∗
(0.0160)
0.0706∗∗∗
(0.0184)
0.0581∗∗∗
(0.0182)
Ethnic group=Mixed −0.2298∗∗∗
(0.0274)
−0.2154∗∗∗
(0.0271)
−0.2020∗∗∗
(0.0280)
Ethnic group=Asian −0.1186∗∗∗
(0.0228)
−0.0817∗∗∗
(0.0252)
−0.0823∗∗∗
(0.0266)
Ethnic group=Black −0.1864∗∗∗
(0.0210)
−0.1497∗∗∗
(0.0222)
−0.1301∗∗∗
(0.0281)
Ethnic group=Other ethnic group −0.0687
(0.0549)
−0.0274
(0.0561)
−0.0252
(0.0594)
EU migrant resident share (2001) −0.0382∗∗∗
(0.0112)
Non-EU migrant resident share (2001) 0.0150
(0.0170)
EU migrant resident growth (2001–2011) 0.0083
(0.0139)
Non-EU migrant resident growth (2001–2011) −0.0136
(0.0128)
Constant 0.3102∗∗∗
(0.0151)
0.4379∗∗∗
(0.0092)
0.3706∗∗∗
(0.0194)
0.3812∗∗∗
(0.0195)
Observations 13,136 13,136 13,136 13,136
Predictive success rate (from logit) 0.5839 0.5839 0.5839 0.5850
Notes: The table reports results from linear probability regressions (OLS). Non-dummy variables are standardized. Authority-level
clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses, asterisks indicate ∗∗∗p <0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p <0.1.
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